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Anti-representationalism: Not a Well-founded Theory of 
Cognition 
 
By Michael David Kirchhoff, 
The University of Wollongong. 
 
Abstract: This article argues for the conclusion that anti-representationalism 
in the cognitive sciences is not a well-founded theory of cognition. This 
conclusion is supported by the observation that the link between the 
sceptical demonstrations and the anti-representational conclusion is too weak 
for the demonstrations to justify anti-representationalism in general. Rather 
than denying the need for internal representation, this article aim to 
establish that representational explanation - reconstructed within a 
dynamical agent-environment characterization - serves a necessary 
epistemic and ontological aim: It enables us to demarcate activities that 
presuppose intentionality and behavioral autonomy from activities that are 
merely reactive and situation-determined. 
 
1. Introduction - the radical embodied cognition thesis 
During a decade or so cognitive science has seen the rise of an anti-representational 
alternative attempting at unseating the concept of internal representation from its 
position as a core theoretical construct of scientific cognitive research. This anti-
representational strand is historically rooted in continental phenomenology, 
especially the works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. It is a direct attack on a 
formerly uncontested assumption: that internal representation distinguishes mind 
from the rest of the physical world. What is in dispute here is not that internal 
brain processes are important to cognition; it is the presence within us of 
identifiable, well-individuated vehicles of content that is being denied. Philosopher of 
cognitive science Andy Clark has summarized the anti- representational 
scepticism under the phrase, The Radical Embodied Cognition Thesis: 
Structured, symbolic, representational, and computational views of cognition are 
mistaken. Embodied cognition is best studied using noncomputational and nonrepresentational 
ideas and explanatory schemes, and especially the tools of dynamic systems theory. (2001, 
p. 128; italics added). 
There are at least two important arguments against representation in the radical 
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embodied cognition thesis. The first of these arguments, the threat from nontrivial 
causal spread, occurs whenever the material vehicles of cognitive architecture are 
causally spread beyond the brain and nontrivially involved in the completion of 
cognitive tasks. The second of these arguments, the threat from continuous 
reciprocal causation, occurs whenever the causal contributions made by components 
of a system partially determines and is partially determined by causal 
contributions of other systemic components, thereby making it impossible to 
assign a specific subtask to an identifiable subsystem within a larger system. None of 
these arguments are derived from arm-chair reflections, but are supported by 
empirical evidence from the major disciplines and fields of research involved in 
the investigation of cognition: neuroscience (e.g., Freeman, 1999), ecological 
psychology (Gibson, 1979), developmental psychology (e.g., Thelen & Smith, 
1994), situated robotics and autonomous agent theory (e.g., Brooks, 1990, 1991, 
1999; Hendriks-Jansen, 1996), philosophy of mind (e.g., Keijzer, 1998; van 
Gelder, 1995, 1998; Wheeler, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2005ab), the dynamical approach 
to cognition (e.g., Haselager et al, 2003ab, Kelso, 2003; Thelen, 2003), and 
computational neuroethology (e.g., Beer, 1995; Chiel & Beer, 1997; Webb,1994, 
1996). 
 
1.2. Paper thesis and its underwriting argument 
The anti-representational challenge to cognitive science is apt and of immense 
importance to the development of future models of cognition. But, as I shall 
show here, it is by no means free of trouble – hence the reason for this article. In 
the article I will show that the link between the empirical demonstrations and the 
sceptical conclusion is too weak for the demonstrations to justify the anti-
representational conclusion. The argument put forth in support of this thesis 
turns on the hypothesis that anti-representationalism is not a well-founded theory 
of cognition. The logical structure of this argument is: 
i. In order for a theory, (T), to count as a well-founded anti-representational 
theory of cognition, (T) must involve no use of representation-laden 
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concepts, and (T) must have conceptually sufficient means to explain 
cognitive phenomena in toto. 
ii. All of the anti-representational demonstrations are merely reactive in 
character, in the sense that all of these demonstrations only pertain to 
systems that are uninterestingly non-cognitive. 
iii. Cognitive properties are emergent properties, but emergent properties – 
together with the tools of dynamical systems theory – are not intrinsically 
nonrepresentational. Therefore: 
iv. Anti-representationalism is not a well-founded theory of cognition. 
Clark has made a similar claim, also targeting an apparent lack of fit between the 
scope of the case studies employed and the scope of the sceptical argument (see 
Clark, 1994, 1997). Although clearly motivated by the line of reasoning 
undertaken by Clark, the strategy put to use here is different. Where Clark points 
out that the kinds of problem-domains involved to justify the sceptic conclusion 
are insufficiently “representation-hungry” for them to do so (see Clark & Toribio, 
1994, p. 418), the present paper goes on to argue an epistemological point - that 
anti-representationalism is not a well- founded theory of cognition - and an ontological 
point - that the anti-representational demonstrations only pertain to systems that 
are uninterestingly non-cognitive. It is easily documented that anti-representationalists 
do indeed make the transition - moving from empirical demonstrations to what is 
taken as a constitutive claim about the nonrepresentational character of cognition 
in general. Consider, e.g., the following claims by leading anti-representationalists: 
Dynamics forms a powerful framework for developing models of cognition that sidestep representation 
altogether. The assumption that cognition must involve representation is based in part on 
inability to imagine how any nonrepresentational system could possibly exhibit cognitive 
performances. Within the dynamical approach, such systems can not only be imagined, they can be 
modelled and constructed. (van Gelder, 1998, p. 622; italics added). 
We conclude here that as all mental activity is emergent, situated, historical, and 
embodied, there is in principle no difference between the processes engendering walking, 
reaching (...) and those resulting in mathematics and poetry. (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. 
xxiii; notes omitted; italics added).  
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(...) there is good evidence that when evolution is given the right evolutionary building 
blocks (...), the result will often be control systems that feature high degrees of 
continuous reciprocal causation. Where that is so, those control systems will be 
stubbornly resistant to (...) representational analysis. (Wheeler, 2005a, p. 229; notes 
omitted). 
The strategy of the rest of this paper is accordingly. I will expound my argument 
in four steps. First, I will unpack the notion of representation. Second, I will deal 
exclusively with the argument from nontrivial causal spread by focusing on 
programmatic presuppositions and empirical cases. Third, I will discuss the threat 
from continuous reciprocal causation. Finally, I will advance and defend the 
thesis of this article. 
 
2. Defining representation 
Any attempt at defining the concept of internal representation needs to take into 
account an important change of inquiry on representation, which is that the 
debate has changed from being about the content of representation to now being a 
debate about the role that representations are supposed to play in behavioral adaptivity and 
intelligence. In the light of recent anti- representational scepticism, it is this latter 
kind of inquiry that will be my focus here. There exist two types of 
representational accounts in cognitive science and philosophy of mind: accounts 
based on the criteria of decoupling - i.e., roughly, the separability of representations 
from their stimulus - and teleological definitions - i.e., roughly, the evolutionary, 
functional role of a representation in adaptive behavior. 
 
2.1. Decoupling based account of representation 
If one holds an account of internal representation based on the criteria of 
decoupling, then a system will be a representational using system if, and only if, 
the three following conditions are upheld: 
• The system must exhibit the presence of inner states whose functional role is 
to “stand in” for environmental features (Haugeland, 1991, p. 62; Smith, 1996, 
p. 220). 
• The system must allow for “precise identification” of inner states or processes 
  5 
with representational roles (Clark, 1997a, p. 147; Wheeler, 2005b, p. 224). 
• The inner states so identified must “enhance” fluent real-time action (Clark & 
Grush, 1999, p. 7; Haugeland, 1991, p. 62). 
 
2.2. Degrees of decoupleability 
For those committed to such decoupling requirements for representation, the 
next (contemporary) question of scientific interest turns on the degree of 
decoupleability necessary for an inner state to qualify as an inner representational 
state. Some theorists hold the view that for (R) to count as a representation of its 
target (T), (R) must be capable of standing-in for temporally and spatially absent 
states of affairs in the world (see e.g., Haugeland, 1991, p. 62; Newell, 1980, p. 
142-47; Smith, 1996, p. 220; and Sterelny, 1990, p. 20-21). On this version of 
decoupleability, (R) and (T) must not be in constant causal contact, (T) must, in some 
cases at least, be fully absent, and (R) must be adaptive. This strong version of 
decoupleability, some theorists do not accept. In fact, a second account of the 
decoupleability definition of representation denies that decoupleable inner states, 
in the strong sense , are necessary for representation, since, so the argument is 
formulated, it rules out cases where inner states function only so as to control 
immediate environmental interaction (see e.g., Ballard, 1991; Clark & Grush, 
1999; and Dorffner, 1999). On the weak (or moderate) view, it is sufficient that 
(R) only stand-in for temporally absent states of affairs. Hence, here (R) and (T) 
must not be in constant causal contact, (T) must be temporally (not spatially) absent, and 
(R) must be adaptive. 
 
2.3. Two types of decoupleability accounts 
Holding a decoupling based account of representation has metaphysical 
consequences that go along with the conceptual ones just sketched. Metaphysical 
issues come forth when considering the relation between internal representation 
and reality (world). On the decoupling side, there exist two versions of how 
internal states are supposed to be related to worldly states of affairs. On the one 
hand there are those advocating a referential relation between inner state and 
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reality and there are those promoting an interactional relation on the other. The 
primary assumption of the referential view is that there is a mind-independent reality 
which must be encoded onto a model in the mind of an agent in order for the 
agent to act intelligently (see e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988; Newell, 1980; Pinker, 
1997; Sterelny, 1990; and others). Now, if one’s theory of representation is 
interactional in character, then for (R) to be a representation, the relation between 
(R) and its target property (T) is believed to be an egocentric, non-objective and action-
oriented relation (occasionally this relation is also called 'internal relation', picked 
up from classical ontological terminology by e.g., Bickhard (2004)). Consequently, 
this particular kind of representational relation differs substantially from its 
referential alternative, because interactional representations do not refer to 
anything in reality; rather, they constitute reality for the organism (see e.g., Ballard, 
1991; Chemero, 2000; Clark, 1997ab; Costa & Rocha, 2005; Damasio, 1994, 
2000; Dorffner, 1999; Kirsh, 1995, 1996; Peschl & Riegler, 1999; Smith, 1996; 
and others). 
 
2.4. Teleological based account of representation 
On the opposite side of the representational landscape, there are those who claim 
that insisting on decoupling as a necessary condition for representation is 
controversial. On this view (R) will count as a representation of its target (T), when 
(R) and (T) are in constant causal contact with one another, when (T) is present, and 
when (R) is adaptive for the system itself. Decoupling, therefore, is conceived as only 
sufficient for representation and not as a necessary criterion. This sort of view is 
often called a teleological account of representation (see e.g., Bickhard & Terveen, 
1995; Bickhard, 2003, 2004; Chemero, 2000; Christensen & Hooker, 2004; 
Millikan, 2004). On a teleological definition, what constitutes that (R) of a system 
(S) will count as a representation for (S) has nothing to do with what (R) is or is 
not related to – or decoupled from. In fact, (R) will count as a representation if, 
and only if, (R) stands between a representation producer and a representation 
consumer; (R) is functionally adaptive with respect to a consumer system; and that 
(R) is part of a larger representational system (see Chemero, 2000, p. 627; 
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Millikan, 2004, p. 75). 
 
3. Extended cognition & nontrivial causal spread 
The phenomenon of nontrivial causal spread surfaces as a kind of background worry 
in a myriad of scientific fields, all of which revolve around the extended 
cognition thesis: That cognitive processes are not located inside an agent exclusively 
and that cognition is co-constituted by such extended physical vehicles. Because of 
this, the locational claim and constitution claim of extended cognition results in 
anti-representationalism whenever the physical vehicles of cognition are causally 
spread beyond the brain and at the root of a particular cognitive task. In principal, 
the sceptical argument advanced from nontrivial causal spread is a direct attack 
on the responsibility requirement of inner representational accounts: In order for (R) 
to justify as a representation - on either the decoupling or the teleological account 
- (R) must be causally responsible for the behavior in question. According to 
Wheeler & Clark (1999) and Wheeler (2001), nontrivial causal spread may de 
defined as follows: 
Causal spread obtains when some phenomenon of interest turns out to depend, in 
unexpected ways, upon causal factors external to the system previously/intuitively thought 
responsible.” (1999, p. 105; italics added). “In the context of cognitive science, non-trivial 
causal spread exists when additional factors reveal themselves to be the unexpected root of 
the very adaptive flexibility and richness that is normally attributed to representation-based 
control. (2001, pp. 217-218; italics added). 
My ambition is not simply to illuminate the insights gathered in Wheeler & Clark 
(1999) and in Wheeler (2001, 2005ab). I aim to move beyond these authors, since, 
I submit, they do not provide a sufficiently nuanced description of the underlying 
intuitions plus arguments, which either motivates or underwrites anti-
representational scepticism ignited by cases of nontrivial causal spread. When 
reading these authors, one is often left with the impression that only one kind of 
phenomenon signifies nontrivial causal spread – namely, cases where extra-neural 
processes take on the role previously thought to be restricted to brain 
states/processes alone. Clearly this is one kind of phenomenon, where nontrivial 
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causal spread is implicated. It’s just not the only one. To make sense of the 
different assumptions and arguments involved in nontrivial causal spread style 
theorizing, I propose setting up a taxonomy. By grouping this anti-
representational phenomenon into different classes, my hope is to shed some 
light on the nature of nontrivial causal spread. 
 
3.1. Taxonomy for nontrivial causal spread 
There are two different kinds of arguments lending themselves as reasons for anti-
representational scepticism, and both of these are embedded in the phenomenon 
of nontrivial causal spread. One kind of argument is rooted in the “principle of 
parity” (e.g., Thelen & Smith, 1994; Wheeler, 2001, 2005b), whereas another 
argument turns on what I will call the “coupling as constitution” argument (e.g., 
Gibson, 1979; Keijzer, 1998; Thelen, 2003; Webb, 1996). 
 First, if (X) – an extra-neural factor/process – and (Y) – a neural 
factor/process – are so coordinated that they together constitute some 
psychological phenomenon (P), and the argument invoked to make this assertion 
is underpinned by the “principle of parity”, then one will hold the view that there 
is no principled difference between (X) and (Y) in their contribution to (P). On this 
view, nontrivial causal spread may be understood to express the following claim: 
If it is equally credible to assign the same functional role to (X), as we normally or 
intuitively do to (Y), then (X) is a part of the cognitive process constituting (P). 
Consider the following remark by Thelen & Smith: 
There is, (...), no essence of locomotion either in the motor cortex or in the spinal cord. 
Indeed, it would be equally credible to assign the essence of walking to the treadmill than 
to a neural structure, because it is the action of the treadmill that elicits the most 
locomotor-like behavior. (1994, p. 17; note omitted; second italics added). 
The parity principle is particularly clear in this remark: If a part of world 
functions as a process, were it performed by the brain, we would not have 
trouble recognizing it as a cognitive process, then that part - in this case the 
treadmill - is part of the cognitive process. From this empirical case, Thelen & 
Smith infer anti-representationalism, evident in the following quotation: 
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How do minds change? Where does new knowledge, (...), new behavior come from? 
How does the organism continually adapt and create new solutions to new problems? 
The answer we present (...) makes no use of representations or representation-like processes. (1994, 
p. 42; notes omitted; italics added). 
Second, if (X) and (Y) are so coordinated that they together constitute (P), and that 
the argument for this kind of nontrivial causal spread turns on what I have 
termed the “coupling as constitution” argument, then one will tend to derive 
anti-representational scepticism from the view that (X) and (Y) jointly govern the 
processes leading to (P). That is, one will entertain the view that (X) and (Y) 
make up a coupled system. More specifically, if (X) and (Y) form a causally coupled 
system, then neglecting to take (X) into account when explaining (P) necessarily 
leads to a failure in recognizing a vital aspect underpinning the generation of (P). 
Hence, (X) and (Y) are causally and constitutively coupled to each other. Contrary to 
the scepticism motivated by the principle of parity, the coupling as constitution 
argument does not turn sceptical from a position of no-principled-difference. 
Instead it turns on the co-constituency of each causal component involved. 
Among those explicitly giving voice to this kind of nontrivial causal spread are 
Keijzer, Thelen and Webb: 
Yet again it appears that it is the interaction of the robot’s uncomplicated mechanisms with 
particular sound fields that produces this interesting – and useful – behavior.” (Webb, 1996, 
p. 67; italics added). “Behavior is an emergent pattern of cooperating components, all of 
which count and none of which are privileged. (Thelen, 2003, p. 20; italics added). 
(...) the notion of representation is to be dispensed with. Instead, behavior is to be explained as 
the intricate interaction between an embodied organism and the specific make up of an 
environment. (Keijzer, 1998, p. 269; italics added). 
Keeping this distinction between nontrivial causal spread motivated by the 
principle of parity and coupling as constitution in mind, let us turn to look at a 
couple of empirical case-studies. 
 
3.3. Infant stepping behavior 
Here is a compelling case of nontrivial causal spread motivated by the principle 
of parity, from research on the development of coordinated stepping behavior in 
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human infants. In spite of being motorically immature, infants will, when held in 
an upright position, precociously lift and lower their legs in a coordinated and step-
like fashion (Thelen & Smith, 1994, pp. 10, 89). But, at approximately 2 months 
of age, this alternating pattern of stepping behavior disappears from the infants’ 
repertoire of motor skills. First at about 8 to 10 months, when the ratio between 
muscle- mass and non-muscle tissue (fat) has settled into equilibrium, do the 
infants regain their prior ability to perform such stepping movements. The final 
milestone is reached at around 12 months of age, where the first independent 
steps become possible (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. 10). In developmental 
psychology, the question is how this universal developmental pattern might be 
reliably explained? 
 In a series of empirical experiments, Thelen & Smith found that during the 
non-stepping window between 2 to 8 months, 7 month old infants will perform 
stepping movements, if they are supported by a slow-moving, motorized treadmill 
(1994, pp. 12, 94). The hypothesis derived from this observation is that the 
mechanical action of the treadmill elicits a shift between non-stepping and 
stepping behavior (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. 96). On their account, the treadmill 
may do so, because it substitutes for changes in leg dynamics that occur naturally in 
adult locomotion. Right after the first foot touches down on the treadmill, the 
infant’s center of gravity is shifted to its stance leg, and the other leg is pulled or 
stretched backwards. This stretch is important informationally. When the trailing leg 
is fully stretched, this will provide the CNS with proprioceptive feedback triggering 
the initiation of a forward swing (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. 96). So, when 
supported on a treadmill, the treadmill will elicit a pattern of self-organizing steps 
“(...) to complete the loop and allow the pattern [of coordinated stepping 
behavior], normally cryptic, to become manifest.” (Thelen & Smith, 1994, p. 97; 
note omitted; square bracketed quotation added). 
 This conclusion makes fully explicit why Thelen & Smith’s experiment on 
treadmill stepping is a demonstration of nontrivial causal spread motivated by the 
principle of parity. It demonstrates that there is no principled difference between 
neural and non-neural factors in their contribution to stepping behavior. If it is 
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equally credible to assign the same functional role to the treadmill, as we normally 
or intuitively do to neuronal processes, then the treadmill is part and parcel of the 
cognitive process constituting coordinate stepping behavior. Moreover, it is a 
clear cut example of Wheeler’s emphasis on scientific discovery – contrary to an 
entrenched understanding, motor development, or stepping behavior, is not 
governed by neural mechanisms only, but is causally spread to factors spatially 
distanced from prior neuro-centric intuitions (2005b: 218). 
 
3.4. Cricket phonotaxis 
Another compelling case of nontrivial causal spread, although this time 
underpinned by the coupling as constitution argument, comes from 
computational neuroethology – especially Barbara Webb’s (1994, 1996) work on 
cricket phonotaxis. Male crickets produce, by rubbing one wing against the other, 
a species-specific song in order to attract a female cricket. The ability of female 
crickets to identify, locate and move towards a specific song, along with all the 
sensorimotor abilities such an activity entails, is known as phonotaxis (Webb, 1996, 
p. 63). Anatomic, neural and environmental details are required for us to 
appreciate this unique skill: 
 A female cricket has two ears, one on each of its two front legs. The 
cricket’s body channels sound through a tracheal tube of fixed length which 
connects the two ears to one another and to further openings, called spiracles, on 
the cricket’s body (Webb, 1996, p. 63). Thus, sound arrives at the ear- drums 
both from an external source (from the male’s signal) and from an internal source (via 
the tracheal tube). Because of the difference of route, a female cricket 
informationally picks-up a male crickets sound accordingly: At the ear closer to 
the sound source, the external sound travels less distance than the internal sound 
arriving via the trachea, whereas, on the side further away from the sound source, 
the two sounds travel the same distance (Webb, 1996, p. 66). Because of the 
difference in distance, the external and internal arriving sounds are out-of-phase at 
the eardrum on the side closer to the sound source, whereas they are in-phase at 
the eardrum located further away. What this means is that the amplitude of 
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eardrum vibration is greater at the eardrum closer to the sound source (Webb, 1996, 
p. 66). According to Webb, the significance of this is immense, because it is the 
higher pitch in eardrum amplitude which elicits the direction of travel chosen by 
the female cricket (1996, p. 63). The direction of travel is achieved via the firing 
rate of a pair of inter-neurons in the crickets’ CNS – one connected to the right ear 
and the other to the left ear (Webb, 1996, p. 64). Which inter-neuron fires first is 
dependent on the strength in amplitude at the eardrums. So, the scientific 
conjecture is that the female crickets CNS triggers a turning toward the side on 
which the sound source is closer, because at the eardrum closer to the sound 
source the pitch in amplitude will be higher than at the eardrum located further 
away (Webb, 1996, p. 64). Here the specific temporal pattern of the male’s signal 
becomes important, since if the firing rate of each inter-neuron is sensitive to a 
certain pitch in amplitude at the eardrum, then the frequency of a male crickets 
sound burst must be important. In fact, what Webb found was that the frequency 
in sound bursts – known as syllables – is the most essential feature in eliciting a 
female response (1996, p. 63). Neither must the period between syllables be too 
long nor too short: too long period’s lead to an informational infrequency from 
poverty in environmental stimuli; and too short period’s lead to an uncertainty as 
to whether which one of the inter-neurons fired first. 
 From this example, Webb goes on to derive the insight that apparently 
complex behavior of an agent does not imply complexity of the underlying 
mechanism (1996, p. 66). Rather, adaptation in female crickets arises from 
interactions nontrivially causally spread across a crickets CNS – the inter-neurons – 
its body – the fixed length tracheal tube and spiracles – and its environment – the 
syllables of the male cricket’s species-specific song. Furthermore, if one fails to 
recognize any of these constituents, thus the argument goes, it’s the equivalent of 
failing to recognize a vital part of natural phonotaxis. 
 
4. Dynamics & continuous reciprocal causation 
While the argument from nontrivial causal spread downplays the kind of 
contribution that neural structures/processes make to the generation of adaptive 
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intelligent behavior, this second sceptical argument advances an empirical (or 
scientific) hypothesis about cognition. It suggests that cognitive phenomena 
emerge from continuous, interdependent and circular causation at the level of systemic 
components. The attack is directed at the locatability requirement of representational 
accounts: In order for a system (S) to justify as a representational system, (S) 
must contain identifiable sub- systems that perform specifiable subtasks. Such is the 
threat from the specific mode of causation identified as continuous reciprocal 
causation (the term is due to Clark, 1997a). 
 
4.1. Exposing the argument of continuous reciprocal causation 
I will begin by exposing the argument in its logical form. Having achieved this, 
the next job will be to present some of the pivotal presuppositions made in the 
argument. Finally the argument, and the assumptions singled out, will be 
elaborated. The argument immanent in the threat from continuous reciprocal 
causation is as follows (e.g., van Gelder, 1995, p. 351; Wheeler, 2005b, pp. 223-
29): 
i. Functional homuncularity is necessary for representation.  
ii. Modularity is necessary for functional homuncularity.  
iii. Many physical systems underlying online (adaptive) intelligence are not 
modular. Therefore:  
iv. Many physical systems underlying online intelligence are not homuncular. 
Therefore:  
v. Many physical systems underlying online intelligence are not representational. 
 
4.2. Homuncularity, modularity & representation 
To cut nature at one if its joints – by taking psychological kinds to be 
representational – while at the same time advocating the view that systemic 
behavior is causally-functionally explicable in terms of the properties of and 
interactions among the properties of that system is the characteristics of orthodox 
cognitive science. It involves appeal to functional homuncularity, modularity and 
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representation (see e.g., Fodor, 1983, pp. 38-66; Sterelny, 1990, p. 13). Wheeler is 
particularly clear on this matter. Functional homuncularity is a subproperty of 
modularity and functional homuncularity is necessary and sufficient for internal 
representation (2005a, pp. 252-60). Thus, if continuous reciprocal causation 
prevents homuncular analysis, and homuncularity is a subproperty of modular 
systems, then to defy modular analysis is also to resist representational 
explanation (see Beer, 1995, p. 208). So is the explicit sceptical presupposition. 
Clarification is required: 
 Functional homuncularity denotes a subset of modular systems. Modularity 
of a system property – e.g., visual perception – presupposes that the system 
property, (Sp), consists of scientifically identifiable subsystems, (Sp1, Sp2,..., Spn), 
each of which performs a clear, well-defined function – e.g., face-recognition – 
and that the overall function of (Sp) is dependent on the mode of organization 
among (Sp1, Sp2,..., Spn). So, to explain the functioning of a complex whole by 
individuating its parts and detailing their overall organization is to engage in 
modular explanation (see e.g., Fodor, 1983, p. 1). Now, if a modular system, (Sp), 
is eligible for homuncular explanation, then (Sp) can be hierarchically decomposed 
into a set of organized communicating subsystems (Sp1, Sp2,..., Spn), where (Sp1, 
Sp2,..., Spn) each contributes to the collective achievement of the overall 
function of (Sp). So functional homuncularity cuts nature slightly different than 
does modularity, because the former says something very specific about the latter 
– namely, that the subsystems, (Sp1, Sp2,..., Spn), interact by passing information to 
each other. The anti- representational case is directly derivable: If continuous 
reciprocal causation undermines modularity, and a necessary requirement for 
representation entails scientific identification of task- specific subsystems, then the 
presence of continuous reciprocal causation undermines the locatability requirement 
necessary for homuncular interpretation. 
 
4.3. Emergence, dynamic systems & continuous reciprocal causation 
A shared implicit assumption of the sceptical argument is (very roughly) the 
empirical hypothesis that certain target properties – including cognitive and 
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psychological ones – are ontologically and epistemologically best conceived of as 
“emergent [properties] of nonlinear dynamical systems (...).” (van Gelder, 1998, p. 616; 
square bracket quotation added; note omitted). Strictly speaking, what the 
assumption implies is that “cognitive properties” are a subset of “dynamical 
properties”, and that “dynamical properties” are “emergent properties”. In fact, if 
a cognitive property is an emergent property, then functional homuncularity and 
modularity are problematic. 
 A defining feature of emergence, as the concept is put to use in the anti-
representational literature, is that emergence of a systemic property is a failure of 
modularity of a systemic property. This tells us something important about being 
emergent. First, emergent properties are systemic properties – i.e. that, a property 
is emergent if and only if the system possesses it but no single component of the 
system possesses it (see e.g., Stephan, 2006, p. 487). Hence, an emergent systemic 
property is a collective property; it is not a property of any single part of a system. 
Second, an emergent property depends on continuous reciprocal causation 
among its subsystemic components (van Gelder, 1995, p. 353). So, if property 
(Sp) is emergent, then (Sp) results from circular, interdependent change among 
its subsystemic parts (Sp1, Sp2,..., Spn). From these two features of emergence, 
some – for instance, Wheeler (2005b, p. 225) – go on to claim that if (Sp) is an 
emergent property, then this prevents explanation of (Sp) in terms of its 
properties (Sp1, Sp2,..., Spn) and their mode of organization. The implicit 
assumption of the argument is that cognitive properties are emergent properties, 
and whenever a property of a system is emergent, it will defy functional 
homuncularity, modularity, and in the end representation. 
 
4.4. Continuous reciprocal causation & the dynamical hypothesis 
Van Gelder has presented just such a sceptical argument. First, ontologically, he 
claims that “cognitive systems may in fact be dynamical systems, and cognition 
the behavior of some (noncomputational) dynamical system.” (1995, p. 358). 
Second, epistemologically, van Gelder claims that the correct explanatory tools of 
cognitive science are those of dynamical systems theory (DST). This is what 
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makes up the dynamical hypothesis (DH) in cognitive science. Carrying the 
evidential load is a central example of a dynamical system – the Watt centrifugal 
governor. The claim he wishes to make is that the Watt governor can and should 
be considered as a prototypical model for cognition (1995, p. 347). 
 The governor was designed by Scottish engineer James Watt circa 1788 as a 
solution to the problem of keeping constant the speed of a flywheel that drives 
industrial machinery, while itself being driven by a steam engine. Since the speed 
of the flywheel is affected both by steam pressure, and by current workload 
placed on the engine (no. of machines being driven, etc.), the speed of the 
flywheel tend to fluctuate. In order to control the flywheel, one must control the 
amount of steam entering the pistons from the engine via a throttle-valve. A 
centrifugal governor is a device which can automatically adjust the throttle value 
so as to maintain constant speed of the flywheel in spite of continuous 
fluctuations in steam pressure and work load. Watt's solution was as follows: 
It consisted of a vertical spindle geared into the main flywheel so that it rotated at a 
speed directly dependent upon that of the flywheel itself. Attached to the spindle by 
hinges were two arms, and on the end of each arm was a metal ball. As the spindle 
turned, centrifugal force drove the two balls outwards and upwards. By a clever 
arrangement, this arm motion was linked directly to the throttle valve. The result was 
that as the speed of the main flywheel increased, the arms raised, closing the valve and 
restricting the flow of steam; as the speed decreased, the arms fell, opening the valve and 
allowing more steam to flow. The result was that the engine adopted a constant speed, 
maintained with extraordinary swiftness and smoothness in the presence of large 
fluctuations in pressure and load. (Van Gelder, 1995, p. 349). 
First, ontologically, van Gelder claims that the operation of Watt’s design 
solution is nonrepresentational in nature (1995, p. 351). This is the “nature hypothesis” 
of the DH: Cognitive agents are, like the governor, dynamical systems, and 
dynamical systems are nonrepresentational in character. He advances four 
different arguments in support of this assertion; only the fourth and most 
interesting will concern us here. Representation presupposes functional 
homuncularity. If a system is homuncular, then it’s necessarily modular. The 
Watt governor, however, does not “exhibit this cluster of properties as a whole, 
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nor any of them individually.” (Van Gelder, 1995, p. 351). So, the governor 
cannot be representational. Against modularity van Gelder asserts that there is no 
possibility of nonarbitrarily cutting the governor’s systemic property, (Sp), into 
scientifically identifiable subsystems (Sp1, Sp2,..., Spn), because (Sp) is an 
emergent property of continuous, simultaneous and interdependent interactions 
among its microstructural parts: 
(...) arm angle and engine speed are at all times both determined by, and determining, 
each other’s behavior. (Van Gelder 1995: 351; note omitted). 
Since functional homuncularity is a subproperty of modular systems, showing 
that the Watt governor prevents modular analysis is sufficient in order to 
underpin the claim that the governor is nonrepresentational in character (van 
Gelder, 1995, p. 354). Therefore, to deny modularity is the equivalent of denying 
homuncularity, which, in turn, prevents representational analysis: 
(...) when we fully understand the relationship between engine speed and arm angle, we 
see that the notion of representation is just the wrong sort of conceptual tool to apply. 
(Van Gelder 1995: 353; note omitted).  
These properties – representation, computation, sequential and cyclic operation, and 
homuncularity – form a mutually interdependent cluster; a device with any one of them 
will standardly possess others. Now, the Watt centrifugal governor does not exhibit this 
cluster of properties as a whole, not any one of them individually. (van Gelder, 1995, p. 
351). 
Second, epistemologically, van Gelder claims that only the conceptual tools of 
DST can explain the circular causation between arm angle and engine speed. This 
is the “knowledge hypothesis” of the DH: Cognitive science can and should take 
dynamical form, and dynamics forms a powerful framework for sidestepping 
representation altogether (1998, pp. 619-22). Formally, a dynamical system is any 
system for which we can provide a finite number of variables (a variable is some 
entity of a dynamic system subject to nonlinear change) and a set of differential 
equations (equations involving a function and one or more derivations) describing 
how the values of those variables change interdependently over time (see e.g., 
Wheeler, 1996, pp. 222-225). DST is the formal framework providing such 
explanatory tools for describing the evolution of dynamical systems over time. 
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The principles governing change in arm angle over time may be described by 
using the following differential equation (van Gelder, 1995, p. 356): 
d2θ/dt2 = (nw)2 cos θ sin θ - g/l sin θ - r dθ/dt 
Where θ is the angle of the arms; n is a gearing constant; w is the speed of the 
engine; g is a constant for gravity; l is the length of the arm; and r is a friction 
constant. This equation describes the nonlinear change in arm angle as a function 
of the current arm angle θ, the way the arm angle is changing already (the 
derivative of θ with respect to time, dθ/dt), and the current engine speed w. Of 
special interest to the knowledge hypothesis is that the equation shows that 
change in arm angle is an “emergent property” of circular causation among the 
systems (d2θ/dt2) subsystemic variables. An important aspect of DST here is that 
it conceives of cognition – and dynamical systems in general – as the unfolding 
of complex structures over time (van Gelder, 1998, p. 621). For instance, the role 
of θ at time t1 is determined (and helps determine) the roles of the other 
components (w and dθ/dt) at t1, and may due to the inherent nonlinearity of the 
system contribute quite differently at t2 in virtue of causally circular and self-
organizing links to other components. DST, it seems, provides us with tools for 
understanding interactive, emergent phenomena – phenomena, so the argument 
is set up, too complex for functional homuncularity, modularity and 
representation. From this equation, van Gelder moves on to consider the steam 
engine itself as a dynamical system causally coupled with the governor (1995, p. 
357): 
dn/dtn= F(w, ..., t, ...) 
Where t is the current setting of the throttle valve, which depends directly on the 
arm angle, θ, of the governor. Just as w is a parameter – i.e., something outside of 
a system, but on which the system causally depends – of the governor system 
above, so θ is a parameter the engine system (van Gelder, 1995, p. 357). In this 
equation, the governor and the engine system form a self- organizing system of 
coupled oscillators – an oscillator is any system which executes periodic behavior 
(e.g., the flywheel, a neural rhythm, etc.) – in which both θ and w function as 
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variables. This mutual influence of two dynamical systems is called coupling – i.e., 
mutual direct interdependence among oscillators. In cases of extended cognition, 
this means that neither system (brain, body and world), considered separately, is 
adequate to explain some cognitive phenomenon. Rather, just like the governor 
and engine system make up a self-organizing system of coupled oscillators, so 
should one conceive of the relationship between brain, body and environment in 
terms of coupled, self-organizing oscillators. Strictly speaking, what this suggests, 
according to van Gelder, is that a framework which invokes homuncular 
decomposition of a system into a set of representational subsystems is 
fundamentally insufficient when having to account for the complex interplay of 
coupled, dynamical systems (1995, p. 369). 
 
5. Anti-representationalism: not a well-founded theory of cognition 
Based on the review of anti-representational arguments, in the previous sections, 
let us now turn to a critical discussion of the actual significance of these 
arguments. Let us begin with the observation that organismic (or animal) 
activities fall (roughly) along a continuum. At the one extreme are purely reactive, 
situationally-determined activities – e.g., tracking the ambient energy of the sun, 
treadmill elicited stepping behavior, phonotaxis, avoiding collisions, and so forth. 
At the other extreme are highly cerebral, situation-independent activities – e.g., 
counterfactual predication, abstract reasoning, concept learning, etc. In the 
middle of this continuum is a class of real-time, representation-hungry activities, where 
behavioral success is neither fully determined by ambient environmental stimuli 
nor fully disconnected from ongoing embodied, situated activity – e.g., adaptive, 
anticipatory behavior, foraging behavior in bees, responding to situational 
saliency, reasoning about the absent (e.g., grooming behavior of rhesus 
macaques), expert drivers, tennis players, carpenters, goal-directed movements, 
etc. 
 
5.1. The scope of the argument 
It is my conjecture that the demonstrations invoked to drive the sceptical 
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conclusion all fall within the class of purely reactive, situationally-determined 
activity. Where intelligent behavior is generated by reactive, situationally-
determined activity, explanations that appeal to representations are, I believe, 
undermined. Either extraneural factors will be at the causal root of the observed 
behavior, thus favouring the conclusion of the threat from nontrivial causal 
spread. Or the behavior of such a reactive system will result from continuous 
reciprocal causation among its subsystemic components, making it scientifically 
hard to assign a specific task (perhaps representational task) to a specific 
subsystem. It is from this conjecture that I derive the thesis that the link between 
the empirical demonstrations and the sceptical conclusion is too weak for the 
demonstrations to justify the anti- representational conclusion. Logically the 
arguments has the following form: 
i. In order for a theory, (T), to count as a well-founded anti-representational 
theory of cognition, (T) must involve no use of representation-laden concepts, 
and (T) must have conceptually sufficient means to explain cognitive 
phenomena in toto. 
ii. The anti-representational (empirical) demonstrations are merely reactive in 
character, in the sense that all of these demonstrations only pertain to systems 
that are uninterestingly non-cognitive. 
iii. Cognitive properties are emergent properties, but emergent properties – 
together with the tools of dynamical systems theory – are not intrinsically 
nonrepresentational. Therefore: 
iv. Anti-representationalism is not a well-founded theory of cognition. 
This argument deals with the threats from the DH and continuous reciprocal 
causation as well as with extended cognition and nontrivial causal spread. The 
DH asserts that there is a large class of dynamical systems for which 
representational glosses have no explanatory utility, and that the best 
explanations of cognitive phenomena fall within this class. The same type of case 
is made by those seeking to marry the extended cognition thesis with nontrivial 
causal spread: If it is the case that extraneural processes are at the causal root of a 
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phenomenon, representational analysis will yield no extra value. Because of this, 
both sceptical arguments are best understood as involving an inference from a 
model (the Watt governor, treadmill stepping, phonotaxis...) to the more radical 
claim of anti- representationalism in general. Ruling in favour of parsimony, I will 
accept the premise that there is indeed a large class of systems for which 
representational explanation have no explanatory (scientific) utility. However, I 
will not accept that it follows from this premise that one must buy in to the 
much stronger conclusion: That the best explanations of cognitive phenomena 
fall within this class. My hypothesis may be schematized accordingly: 
Here is a model of either some extended system or some nonlinear, dynamical system - 
for instance, the WG, infant treadmill stepping, etc. There are no representations in 
anyof these models [This is right]. So, if cognition in general really works like these models 
do, then there are no representations in cognition either. [This is not right]. 
Three things follow. First that the nature hypothesis of the DH is fundamentally 
flawed. Second that the knowledge hypothesis of the DH is flawed. Third, and 
lastly, that the threat from nontrivial causal spread is equally unsound. 
 
5.2. Nontrivial causal spread & representation-hungry problem-domain 
The anti-representational (empirical) demonstrations used to motivate anti-
representationalism fall within the class of purely reactive, situationally-
determined behavior, thus pertaining only to systems that are uninterestingly 
non-cognitive. This is the second premise in the argument against anti- 
representationalism as a well-founded theory of cognition. In order not to beg 
questions, an additional argument will be introduced in support of this premise. 
Its logical form is: 
i. Behavioral autonomy and intentionality are necessary and sufficient 
conditions in order to demarcate genuinely cognitive systems from merely 
reactive systems.  
ii. A necessary prerequisite for behavioral autonomy and intentionality is the 
presence of internal states that “stand-in” for immediate perception, and 
function as “control structures” for action.  
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iii. The anti-representational (empirical) demonstrations of intelligent, adaptive 
behavior are unable to meet these requirements. Therefore:  
iv. The anti-representational (empirical) demonstrations are merely reactive in 
character. Therefore:  
v. The anti-representational (empirical) demonstrations do not justify as 
genuinely cognitive systems. 
 
5.2.1. Stipulative definitions - intentionality & behavioral autonomy 
Intentionality, as the term is put to use here, specifies the information-bearing 
properties of certain neurophysiological processes or states in the brain of human 
and nonhuman animals that consists in their having the function of carrying 
specific types of semantically evaluable content. There is nothing controversial about 
this stipulation. But note that in the context of dynamical cognitive science, this 
account conceptualizes the “aboutness” of intentionality in terms of possibilities for 
(inter)action and that such action-oriented states have correctness conditions (see e.g., 
Hutto ,1999, p. 58; Toribio, 2007, p. 446). What this means is that intentional, 
action-specifying states are susceptible to error detection - i.e., such states can be 
detected as correct (true) or incorrect (false) for the animal itself. Note that this 
stipulation of intentionality corresponds to the definition of representation on 
the interactional and teleological accounts. 
 Behavioral autonomy, as the term is put to use here, specifies the ability of an 
agent to bring its own experiences onto a particular situation, and from which the 
agent’s action will emerge from the joint interactions of its experiences and the 
current contextual situation (see e.g., Beer, 1995, p. 173; Ziemke, 1999, p. 183). 
Note that an autonomous agent, in this behavioral sense, is fundamentally different 
from a reactive agent. According to Pfeifer, a reactive agent does not incorporate its 
own background experience – it always reacts the same way in the same situation 
(1995, p. 47-70). A second significant feature of behavioral autonomy has to do 
with automaticity; in fact, automaticity is a necessary element of any kind of 
autonomy (Ziemke, 1998, p. 568). By stipulating behavioral autonomy as automatic, 
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this means that for an agent (A) to be behaviourally autonomous, (A) must 
exhibit the ability to adapt its behavior within a dynamic environment, and (A) 
must do so in ways that are appropriate (or beneficial) in current situations (see 
also Bickhard, 2004, p. 78). Note that this stipulation conquers with the 
interactional and teleological accounts of representation. 
 
5.3. The flaw of the threat from nontrivial causal spread - infant stepping 
The basic trouble identified concerning the case of anti-representationalism 
based on nontrivial causal spread is that the sceptic substantially overstates his or 
her case. It seems to me that much of the scepticism stems from an unwarranted 
conflation of extreme nontrivial causal spread with cases of nontrivial causal spread in 
general. What lends support for this claim is that the demonstration of infant 
treadmill stepping is exactly such a conflation. It illustrates that the stepping 
behavior is not governed by neural mechanisms, but causally spread to factors 
spatially distanced from prior neural intuitions - in the non-neural body and 
environment. It is important to notice that this case study is set up so as to show 
that the presence of nontrivial causal spread can be used to drive an anti- 
representationalist assault if coupled with an additional claim: the claim that no 
neural factors can meet the responsibility requirement of internal representational 
accounts - in order for (R) to justify as a representation of its target (T), (R) must 
be located in the central nervous system, (T) must be fully absent, and (R) must 
be responsible for adaptive, intelligent action. This is a case of extreme nontrivial 
nontrivial causal spread. Not only are additional cognitive processes localized 
beyond the bounds of the brain - in this case, the treadmill. In fact, these spatially 
extended processes are argued to be the constitutive processes. In so doing, it 
follows that the demonstration of infant treadmill stepping falls within the 
ontologically extreme class of purely reactive, situationally-determined activity on 
the continuum of organismic activity. By conflating cases of extreme nontrivial 
causal spread with nontrivial causal spread in general, the anti-representationalist 
ignores several substantial features. First, the conflation overlooks that in cases of 
nontrivial causal spread, where cognitive processes are both embodied and 
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situated, interactivist representations - teleological and interactional - may play a key 
role in promoting organismic adaptivity. Second, dismissing the possibility that 
real-time, intelligent action requires the presence of internal representations - 
even in a situated and embodied sense - inhibits explaining (intelligent) behavior in 
terms of intentionality and behavioral autonomy, and, therefore, delimits the anti-
representational demonstrations from falling within the ontological class of 
genuinely cognitive systems. Support favouring an interactivist account of inner 
representation coupled with nontrivial causal spread is the case of motor emulation. 
 
5.4. Interactivist representation & motor emulation - a case for the second premise 
Skilled reaching is the smooth, trouble-free orientation of an arm and hand 
system directed at some target object. The achievement of real-time, adaptive 
success in cases of rapid on-line reaching depends, so Clark & Grush inform us, 
upon the CNS receiving and responding to proprioceptive feedback – in 
particular, when such information is not visually available (1999, p. 6). 
Proprioceptive feedback here involves information about arm/hand orientation, 
position and trajectory. What is interesting about skilled reaching behavior is that 
due to an inherent speed limitation of the CNS, proprioceptive feedback from 
extra-neural states (in this case, bodily) is often required faster than it is available. 
It is in such instances that motor emulation is crucial so as to enhance fluent, real-
time action. Motor emulation is a piece of motor control circuitry, whose proper 
function is to predict sensory feedback prior to the signals arriving from the bodily 
peripheries (Clark, 1997b, p. 471). Hence, an emulator is a control system, within 
an overall system, that takes as input information concerning the current state of 
the system (e.g., the state of the arm, direction of motion, etc.) and gives as output 
a prediction of the future feedback from the arm/hand system, thereby 
dynamically presupposing future positioning and trajectory of the arm before 
actual feedback arrives. On my account, as well as Clark & Grush’s, motor 
emulation is important, because it illuminates a set of features of significance 
with respect to internal representation. 
 First, the output of the emulator circuitry stands-in for immediate perception, 
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and functions as control structures for action. Earlier we identified these conditions 
as necessary in order to justify as a representation. In fact, the output of motor 
emulation is compatible with what I earlier termed the minimal decoupleability 
condition for interactional representations: (R) – the output of emulation – and its 
target (T) are not in constant causal contact, (T) is temporally absent – the emulator 
is not receiving input directly from what it represents – and (R) is adaptive – (R) 
enhances behavioral success in the temporal absence of immediate stimuli. Prima 
facially motor emulation allows for an evolutionary minimal sense of behavioral 
autonomy: it is functionally disconnected from behavioral reactivity and situation 
determination, and it brings its own embodied experiences (i.e., dynamic 
predictions) to bear in determining action. 
 Second, the content carried by the inner vehicles of the emulation circuitry is 
semantically evaluable – it is subject to conditions of correctness. For instance, if the 
predictions do not hold – turn out to be correct – then the content of the 
predictions are incorrect (see also Bickhard, 2004, p. 78). Because of this, in the 
case of real-time, representation-hungry activity, the content of inner 
interactivitist vehicles of content can be true (correct) or false (incorrect), and can 
be so about the environment. Motor emulation, so it would seem, constitutes the 
minimal requirements for intentionality and behavioral autonomy, which, in turn, 
are both necessary and sufficient conditions in order to demarcate genuinely 
cognitive systems from merely reactive systems. 
 
5.5. The first flaw of the nature & knowledge hypotheses of the DH 
Justifiability for an anti-representational account of cognition turns on the 
completeness condition: In order for a theory, (T), to count as a well-founded anti-
representationalist theory of cognition, (T) must involve no use of representation-
laden concepts, and (T) must have conceptually sufficient means to explain 
cognitive phenomena in toto. This is the first premise of the argument against 
anti- representationalism as a well-founded theory of cognition. Why think that 
the completeness condition is questionable? 
 Some authors – especially, Chemero (2000) and Bechtel (1998) – question 
  26 
van Gelder’s (1995) claim that the WG is a nonrepresentational dynamical system. 
That is, these authors question the first horn of the first premise: that (T) must 
involve no use of representation-laden concepts. On Chemero’s view, the WG 
can be interpreted such that the angle of the arm (representation) carries 
information about the speed of the flywheel (representation producer) and the throttle 
valve (representation consumer) uses the information about arm angles to 
coordinate its behavior, and so adapt to the represented speed of the flywheel 
(Chemero, 2000, p. 632). Because of this, one plausible route to take against the 
anti-representational sceptic is to make the conceptual claim that the arm angles of 
the WG count as internal representations for the throttle valve mechanism. Both 
of these authors therefore go on the claim that we have no reason to think that 
cognition is inherently nonrepresentational (see e.g., Bechtel, 1998, p. 299). 
Although this argument prima facially puts pressure on both the nature and the 
knowledge hypothesis of the DH, I do not find it to be a very attractive response 
to make against the sceptic. Two reasons support my position. 
 The first reason turns on the suspicion that if representations become 
ubiquitous, what extra value can they have for the study of cognition? This worry 
is exactly why I agree with the DH that there is a large class of dynamical models 
for which explanation in terms of representation has no utility. If the notion of 
representation is applicable to every system from purely reactive, situationally- 
determined systems such as the WG..., to highly cerebral, situation-independent 
systems, then there is a real danger that the notion of representation threatens to 
lose its explanatory substance. In fact, the value of not interpreting the WG as a 
representational system is that it allows us to demarcate representational systems 
from systems to which the notion does not apply. The second reason critically 
targets the second horn of premise one: That (T) must have conceptually sufficient 
means to explain cognitive phenomena in toto. Evidence for this critique is 
provided by premise two above: A nonrepresentational theory of cognition is 
unable to meet the minimal requirements for genuine cognition. Here the first 
flaw of the nature hypothesis and the knowledge hypothesis of the DH reveals 
itself: 
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 On the one hand, ontologically, if cognitive agents are dynamical systems, 
and a minimum requirement for genuine cognition is the presence of interactivist 
vehicles standing-in for immediate perception, then some dynamical systems are 
representational using systems. It is just that the WG is not such a system. 
Therefore, one is not justified in inferring from the nonrepresentational nature of 
the WG to cognition in general (see e.g., Clark & Toribio, 1994, p. 421). This has 
implications for the nature hypothesis of the DH, because it suggests that some 
activities, performed by cognitive agents, do involve the presence of internal 
representations. On the other hand, epistemologically, if cognitive science ought 
to adopt a dynamical approach to the study of cognition, and some cognitive 
activities fall within the class of real-time, representation-hungry activity, then 
some dynamical explanations, even if these do not explicitly mention internal 
representations, must presuppose the use of internal representations by the 
systems under investigation. This has implications for the knowledge hypothesis 
of the DH. First, it suggests that the conceptual tools of DST are important with 
respect to dealing with complex, coupled dynamical systems – like the WG. 
Second, only if the operations of a dynamical system is driven by sufficient 
amounts of ambient stimuli, then the dynamical systems theoretical explanation 
needed will be nonrepresentational; otherwise not. Therefore, DST ought not 
sidestep representational issues altogether, but rather attempt to articulate 
representations within the dynamical framework itself (for related views see 
Bickhard & Terveen, 1995; Bickhard, 2003, 2004; Christensen & Hooker, 2004; 
Clark & Toribio, 1994; Clark, 1997a, 2001; Eliasmith, 1996, 1997; and others). 
 
5.6. The second flaw of the nature & knowledge hypothesis of the DH 
Cognitive properties are emergent properties, but emergent properties – together 
with the tools of dynamical systems theory – are not intrinsically 
nonrepresentational. This is the third premise offered in the dispute against anti-
representationalism as a well-founded theory of cognition. Here we will confront 
what I, among others, take to be the hardest of the sceptical positions: Cognitive 
properties are emergent properties, and an emergent property, (Sp), depends on 
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continuous reciprocal causation among its subsystemic parts (Sp1, Sp2,..., Spn), 
thus making it empirically impossible to assign specific functional and/or 
representational roles to scientifically identifiable subsystems (see e.g., van Gelder, 
1995, p. 354; Wheeler, 2005b, p. 225). Generally speaking, the sceptics conclude, 
if a systemic property is emergent, then it defies modular explanation; modularity 
is necessary for internal representation; so, if continuous reciprocal causation 
prevents modular explanation, and modularity is necessary for representation, 
then to prevent modular explanation is also to resist representational explanation. 
My hypothesis is, insofar as the WG is meant to highlight the justifiability of a 
well-founded, anti-representational theory of cognition, it fails to do so. Not only 
because of the flaws identified thus far, but since it seems to me that a systemic 
property – for instance, change in arm angle in the WG – is an emergent property 
and (importantly) without being resistant to modular explanations. 
 Emergent properties are systemic properties. A property of a system is systemic 
if and only if it is a collective property of the overall system and not a property of 
any part of the system. The WG functions so as to maintain the speed of the 
flywheel constant in spite of fluctuations in steam pressure and workload. The 
systemic property of the WG is constant speed. Of special significance is that 
“constant speed” emerges from what Clark calls emergence as unprogrammed 
functionality (2001, p. 114): If (Sp) is an emergent property of a system, then (Sp) 
arises as a kind of unprogrammed “side-effect” from the interactions among the 
variables comprising the system (Sp1, Sp2,..., Spn). For instance, the WG and the 
engine system constitutes a coupled dynamical system, in which θ (the angle of 
the governor’s arms) and w (engine speed) function as subsystemic variables. 
Because of this, constant speed is a collective and unprogrammed property, 
whose value reflects the interactions of θ and w comprising the system. 
 An emergent property is dependent on continuous reciprocal causation 
among its individual parts. Clark classifies this feature as emergence from interactive 
complexity. By this he means that “emergence [is] the process by which complex, 
cyclic interactions give rise to stable and salient patterns of systemic behavior.” 
(2001, p. 114; square bracketed quotation added). On the one hand, this entails 
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that there can be no difference in a systems systemic properties unless there is a 
difference in the properties of the system’s parts or their mode of organization. 
Constant speed is thus directly dependent on θ and w. On the other hand, it 
illustrates that an emergent property is the result of circular, interdependent 
causal processes among its individual parts. So, constant speed is a function of w, 
which itself is a function of θ, and where any change in w changes the dynamics 
of θ – hence, constant speed is indirectly a function of θ. 
 The functioning of the WG is (interestingly) emergent – that is, we gain 
significantly by treating it as such and by providing a dynamical systems style of 
description to capture its overall dynamics. But for all that, if we know the 
variables of the system and once a specification of these variables has be given by 
a set of differential equations, then the behavior of the WG has been given a 
modular explanation as well. For example, the equation, (dnw/dtn = f (w,..., 
t,...)), specifies a set of individual variables – w and t – and explains their mode 
of organization – w is a function of current engine speed, which itself is 
dependent on t (the throttle valve setting), which is a function of θ – and it 
defines “coordinated coupling” as an emergent property. Therefore, the WG 
allows for an account of emergent behavior, together with an account that 
identifies the individual variables and their overall organization. Importantly, since 
van Gelder offers the WG as a paradigmatic dynamical system, and as a 
prototypical model for a new paradigm in cognitive science, the fact that the WG 
is not resistant to modularity opens a space of possibilities: It implies that other 
dynamical models of cognition – such as those that fall within the class of 
representation-hungry activities – might be emergent plus modular – modularity 
being a necessary condition for empirically identifying representations within a 
system. Therefore, neither dynamic systems nor DST are inherently anti-
representational, and, consequently, anti-representationalism cannot be justified 
as a well-founded theory of cognition. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In the foregoing sections, I have presented arguments to show that the links 
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between the dynamic demonstrations – phonotaxis, infant stepping behavior, Watt 
governing, avoiding obstacles... – and the sceptical conclusion are too weak (i.e., 
insufficient) for the demonstrations to justify the radical anti-representational 
conclusion. Hence, I think it is justified - relative to the premises I have used and 
tried to substantiate - to conclude that anti-representationalism per se is an ill 
motivated theory of cognition. Parsimony, I have argued, rules in favour of 
rejecting the need for a representational analysis. This is a major strength of the 
anti-representational position – it makes evident the existence of the class of 
dynamical systems for which representational analysis has no scientific value. 
Nonetheless, we have found reasons upon which to base the claim that we need 
not accept the much stronger sceptical conclusion – namely, that the best 
explanations of cognitive phenomena fall within this class. Rather than denying 
the need for representation, I have tried to highlight that representational 
explanation – reconstructed within a dynamical agent-environment 
characterization – serves an indispensable explanatory task: It enables us to 
demarcate activities that presuppose intentionality and behavioral autonomy 
from activities that are merely reactive and situation- determined. The former 
falls within the class of representation-hungry activities, whereas the latter does 
not. Hence, anti-representationalism per se is an excessively costly undertaking, 
since it prevents cognitive science from dealing with vitally important issues such 
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